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INTRODUCTION
I t took a long time to become aware of the decline. The
principal factors were internal and human, and therefore
avoidable: . . . entrepeneurship had become flabby; growth
industries and new technology were not pursued with suf
ficient vigor; technical education and science were lagging;
and the government-business relationship was not one of
mutual support.1
The above quote could be easily applied to the realm of presentday American business, yet the words are an economic historian's obser
vations on the causes of Britain's climacteric which occurred more than
one hundred years ago.

Public reaction to the plight of Britain's

industries was forty years too late since concern was not aroused
until after World War I .

Hopefully, the same time lag will not occur

i n the United States where American industry now grapples with many of
the same issues which plagued British industries over a century ago.
In analyzing American business today, in the perspective of
history, the danger signals of decline seem obvious:

high interest

rates are prohibiting industrial expansion. United States capital re
investment in new technology is minimal compared to other advanced
industrial nations, the quality of American science and mathematics
education i s of concern, and the United States government is seen as a
restrictive regulator by many American businessmen.

The causes of

these problems afflicting American industries are varied, but very
often American managers are blamed.

Some individuals believe that at

least f i f t h percent of business problems are due to management
factors:^ simply put, bad managers.
1
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The formal education of today's business managers does not ade
quately prepare the new professional for his role "as the change agent
in a business society that the United States, for better or worse,
i s . U n i v e r s i t i e s are alleged to be centers of training rather than
centers of learning.

This failure to nurture the creative knowledge

within the individual i s the root cause of the American managerial c r i 
sis.

Imagination, intuition, and the need to review how human beings

learn and invent must be implanted within the philosophy of management
education.^

I f American industries are to alleviate their problems,

i t must be understood "that in an ultimate sense, the problems are
problems of practical philosophy and . . . philosophy is everyone's
business.
This awareness of the importance of philosophy, not a specific
technique, i s responsible for the success of Japanese management.
Managerial methods in Japan are in many ways of American origin.
For example, the concept of stable employment was advocated
by Max Weber in his famous theory of bureaucracy. The ideas
of organizational family, employee participation, group
management, and job enrichment were advocated by such
American scholars as Chris Argyris, Peter Drucker, Fred
Herzberg, Rensis Likert and Douglas McGregor. The Japanese
borrowed such concepts and adapted them to their culture.®
American managers hope that combining American business techniques with
Japanese cultural philosophies will result in better management.^
This explains the keen interest American managers have exhibited in
recent years toward understanding the successful Japanese style.
Specifically, they wish to know which aspects of Japanese management
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can be implemented within their own firms to create a more viable and
productive organization.
In line with that goal, the purpose of this paper i s to discuss
the major principles of Japanese managerial style which can be, and
have been, exported to the United States.

The "lessons" for the

American manager, as outlined by William H. Franklin, Jr., are:
1.

To develop a long-term view towards business practices.

2.

To promote an increased partnership between management and
labor to f u l f i l l the needs of the firm and the employee.

3.

To increase openness in organizational structure and interac
tive communication.

4.

To share organizational authority.

5.

To realize the need for the ongoing search for improved
producti vi ty.°

Each point will be discussed independently, but f i r s t i t i s necessary
for the American manager to develop an appreciation for the unique
environment in which the Japanese managers operate.

Chapter 1
JAPANESE CULTURAL FACTORS
The Japanese word, j_e, i s a concept that can be
interchangeably applied to everything from self to home to
family. A person is an extension of his immediate family
members, his company, his community, and his nation as a
whole. All are bound together in an encompassing purpose.^
As stated, the Japanese culture is unique.

The American manager

must realize that the Japanese managerial style has been fostered and
supported by i t s cultural environment.

Therefore, the exportation of

certain managerial practices may be impossible because of the cultural
barriers.

Within the Japanese labor force there is a strong sense of

nationalism which produces a high level of motivation in Japanese
workers.

For over a century, "Japan has invested i t s best segments of

capital and labor with special stress to strengthening the competitive
power of i t s export industries."^0

This national commitment has

increased the dedication of the Japanese worker.
Confucian teachings. Buddhism, and Shinto are often cited as the
foundation of the Japanese ethos which places a high value on dedica
tion and accomplishment.

These accomplishments are realized at the

work place, not solely for the individual, but for the good of the
n a t i o n . T h i s i s evidenced by the Japanese business executive who is
different from his foreign counterparts, in that the Japanese executive
i s "a latter-day embodiment of the traditional samurai morality."12
i s not the profit incentive which motivates him, but rather his devo
tion to his firm and the advancement of his nation.

it
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Physical limitations have in some ways forced the development of
this national motivation.

Japan's lack of natural resources has driven

the people to improve their standard of living by their own collective
will and l i t t l e else.

I t follows that Japan must increase the labor

productivity in i t s export-oriented industries in order to support a
population of more than one hundred ten million people with such
limited cultivable

land.
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jhe combination of these historical and

economical elements has created a highly motivated work force.

One

American manager after touring a Japanese manufacturing plant was to
comment that
. . . these workers here work hard and they were working
just as hard when we weren't looking! I have seen an inten
sity in the work force that I don't think exists anywhere
else in the world.
This national commitment has spawned traditions of duty, obedience
and discipline which favor the paternalistic clan form of organization
found within Japanese industries.

As long ago as 1898 this paternalism

was seen in the Japanese way of thinking.

I t was then that the Tokyo

Chamber of Commerce wrote that "relations between employees an
employers are just like those within family.

The young and the old

help one another and consult together in both good times and

bad.

"15

This philosophy abetted the establishment of mutual aid and retirement
systems for workers around 1905.

Up to this point in time i t was not

uncommon for apprentices to move from one company to another before
finishing their training for a higher wage.

By providing this added

security, workers stopped moving from company to company.!^
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Familial roots are a basic tenet of Japanese corporate l i f e ,
whereas in American business the principles of contract govern the cor
porate structure.

The pros and cons of each style are numerous, but

one Japanese executive may have a valid point when he asks, "Which has
the greater potential for lasting strength in the marketplace:

the

firm held together by contracts, or one which assumes a degree of human
i s t i c solidarity?"^^

The energy of human bonds would seem to be more

effective than the imprint of ink on paper.
The Japanese workers submit themselves to the paternalistic com
pany for a variety of reasons.

The population has long been accustomed

to a highly disciplined way of l i f e throughout their school years.
Japanese education emphasizes discipline and

conformi

ty,^8

which seek the security that a Japanese firm can offer.

qualities

In the crowded

megalopolises of Japan no strong human ties exist in the form of neigh
borhoods, as known in America.

Therefore, individuals seek community

at the w o r k p l a c e . A Japanese company has two facets - - a functional
body and a community.

The employee and his family feel secure

belonging to a huge company.

With this control over the employees, i t

is asserted that the Japanese firm provides i t s employees with a sense
of l i f e worth.20
Another factor contributing to this worker submission is that
because of the intense competition for good employment opportunities,
the Japanese worker i s very diligent and develops a strong sense of
belonging to his company.

Most Japanese expect to remain with the same

company throughout their

c a r e e r . 21

i s t i c as well as practical.

The motives of management are human

I t i s usual for the employer "to consider

the departure of a 'basic worker' as a failure of personnel management.
The worker was hired under the premise that he would be a lifetime
employee i n o r d e r t o m a i n t a i n r e t u r n s on investment i n

t r a i n i n g .

Also, a family-like relationship helps to minimize the antagonism which
often results between management and labor and produces strikes.
The Japanese worker also has a need to belong.

To f u l f i l l this

need he is willing to subordinate himself to the higher collective
goals of the firm.

"The Japanese equivalent of the Protestant

work ethic lies in the concept of sacrificing personal interest for the
organizational

good.

"23

Individualism i s encouraged in Western society,

but just the opposite within the Japanese culture.

In Japan, "being a

unique person is often assumed to be bad because being unique implies th
one i s not well balanced . . . . The most important aim i s not the in
dividual good; rather i t is trying to keep

harmony."24

Maintaining har

mony within a group i s of paramount importance in a l l Japanese relations
The notion of "saving face" stems from this, as i t is considered highly
improper to embarrass an individual.

This avoidance of conflict i s

necessary according to one Japanese government official who says,
"Our system i s born of the traditions and history of this
country, a small nation with few resources. Without our way
of doing things, there would be continued conflict and
nothing would ever get d o n e . "25
The Japanese language contains no single word that means privacy.
This

is reflected within the work groups in Japanese firms as co-

workers know each other so well that they assume responsibility as a
group for the errors of one i n d i v i d u a l T h e distinction to be made
i s that the individual does not assume responsibility for his actions.
The group does.

Therefore the cohesiveness of the group is

strengthened, and the individuals work for the group, not themselves.
Within the aforementioned paternalistic clan organization working
toward a common goal i s taken for granted, as noted by William G.
Ouchi, a student of Japanese organizations.
. . . I n a clan, each individual i s effectively told t o d o
just what is needed. However, the socialization of all to
a common goal i s so complete and the capacity of the system
to measure the subtleties of contribution over the long-run
i s so exact that individuals will naturally seek to do that
which i s in the common g o o d . 2 7
I n i t i a l l y , this idea may seem incomprehensible to the Westerner
who places a great deal of emphasis on individuality.

The American

manager may also feel that his subordinates would not f u l f i l l the com
mitment toward working for a common goal.

This very theme is obvious

in Western philosophy, as pointed out by Ouchi.
Subordinating individual tastes to the harmony of the group
and knowing that individual needs can never take prece
dence over the interests of all is repellent to the Western
citizen. But a frequent theme of Western philosophers and
sociologists is that individual freedom exists only when
people willingly subordinate their self-interests to the
social interest.28
Quite possibly. Westerners may not be as individualistic as they per
ceive themselves to be.

Contrary to the feelings of American managers

workers may indeed work in a dedicated manner, toward a common goal, i
given the appropriate direction.
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Japanese productivity and quality at the work place are enhanced
by this group orientation.

In addition, the Japanese worker i s even

more conscientious and diligent because many Japanese believe in their
work as the highest s e l f - f u l f i l l i n g goal for them to attain.

Japanese

workers do regard their work as the most important part of their
overall l i v e s . T h e y view their company as an extension of their
family l i f e .

Many of them equate the importance of their company with

that of their own life.^®

While holding their work in such esteem i t

i s clear as to why the quality of Japanese workmanship is so high.
Throughout his schooling a Japanese child is being prepared for
his future career.
at all levels.

Competition is acute for entry into certain schools

The drive to f u l f i l l the goal of obtaining a secure

position begins at a very early age.

This attitude of Japanese career

development i s not at all common in the United States.
In Japan, work i s not considered to be an infringement on
human freedom. The Japanese believe that to work i s to live
and that at work one establishes identity. Neither blue- or
white-collar workers consider their interests to be opposed
to those of the company; a worker's salary and bonuses
reflect the company's success.
This same attitude is reflected in other facets of the Japanese
work environment.

To the Japanese worker delays are something to be

ashamed of and might cause problems for others.

The concern for others

i s also a reason why the Japanese worker will not take a l l his allotted
vacation time.
the office.

The workers hate to inconvenience their colleagues in

The average Japanese employee works 2,114 hours per year,

while his Western counterpart works 2,000 hours per

year.

32

^ot
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surprisingly, the rate of absenteeism i s very low, less than one per
cent in most

industries.

T h e s e statistics lend credence to the fact

that the Japanese view their work as more than "just a job."
The Japanese government puts forth a great effort to ensure that
the unemployment rate in Japan is held low.

"The close ties between

Japanese government and industry have generated much criticism from
Americans, but these ties are an extension of the same philosophy - working together for the nation's

good.

"34

Government regulation is

often used by American managers as the scapegoat for many of the pro
blems afflicting American industry.

I t generally comes down to a

matter of attitude when comparing the two vastly different cultures.
In Japan, unlike in the United States, i t is generally held that a
strict government that regulates business will bring progress,
prosperity and a better society.35

Contrary to what many American managers may believe, Japanese
industry is subject to a f a i r amount of government regulation in Japan.
Japanese executives perceive their government differently from how
their American counterparts view their own government.

"Business

operations are based on human ties - - priority is placed on good human
relations rather than on stringent regulations."36

There is more

cooperation between the government and industrial sectors in Japan than
i n the United States.

When a decision i s implemented by the Japanese

government i t is thought to be best for the society at large.

This is

in direct contrast to the American "adversarial culture in which business.
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labor and government are constantly at one another's throat.

An adver

sarial system i s not the correct way to develop a coherent, pragmatic
economic policy."^^
Several examples will show how the government i n Japan acts for
the good of society.

Between 1965 and 1979 Japanese industry spent

more than fifteen billion dollars on pollution controls.38

jhe

Japanese government would not reduce air quality standards as the
United States government did during the o i l crisis of 1973-74.
Japanese scientists were forced to find new alternatives.

The Japanese

government did allow a l l of the automakers in Japan to combine
resources and work together to develop a method to reduce auto
emissions.

This would have been illegal in the United States because

of anti-trust laws.

Japan's cooperative effort appears to have a more

coherent and effective strategy in dealing with air pollution as they
are ahead of the United States by two years in emission-control
technology.These Japanese regulations are formed only when the par
ties involved agree, after a long period of discussion.
Another example is in the area of finances.

The Japanese govern

ment guarantees loans to some Japanese businesses ensuring that these
companies will not go out of business.

Interest rates in May, 1982,

were 6.55 percent in Japan compared to the United States prime rate of
16.5 p e r c e n t . T h e fact that the Japanese savings rate is much higher
than that of the United States definitely has a bearing on the lower
interest rates in Japan.

In many ways the Japanese government provides

a healthy climate for the business sector, but the government-
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interference argument i n the United States i s far too simple for the
American manager to explain away his woes.

Many American industries

have shown a pathological inability to look toward their welfare in the
l o n g - r u n . T h i s i s the f i r s t lesson the American manager may learn
from his Japanese counterpart:
ness practices.

develop a long-term view towards busi

Chapter 2
A LONG-TERM VIEW
This is where the challenge to American management practice
lies. When we can admit to the exorbitant costs of turnover
- - the cost of replacement, the loss of continuity and sta
bilization, and the reluctance to invest heavily in the edu
cation of people we may lose in a few years - - and when we
begin to believe that the interests of employees and their
firms can converge for long periods, perhaps careers, we will
have broken through the principle obstacle blocking develop
ment of the benefits in long-term perspective to business
management.
Japanese managers are amazed that American managers receive bonu
ses which are related solely to the previous year's results.

To the

Japanese this will lead directly to neglecting important steps having
to do with the long-term future of any company.

Planning for a one or

two year period does not seem wise to the Japanese because of the dyna
mic environment in which their companies must function.

The keen

attention to this state of flux i s partly culturally inbred as the
"Japanese are reluctant to believe any unitary view of the world
thoroughly.

This manifests itself in the idea that the world is

constantly changing and everything will move on like a flowing river,
which i s enhanced by the Buddhist view of the w o r l d . H e n c e , a stra
tegy that may be beneficial for a firm in the coming year, may well be
detrimental in the long-run.
In comparison to the American firm the Japanese do everything with
a view toward the long-term results.

For example, i f the Japanese had

a market for one million tons of a product, they would build a plant
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with a capacity for four million tons.

Then they would lose money until

they h i t the breakeven point, but eventually i t pays off.^^

One

American industry analyst was noted to observe that "our foreign com
petition in the world of trade is more than ready to make market
investments that may not pay off for a decade.

They are willing to

spend years positioning themselves to conquer the global markets.
The Japanese have shown us through their success that patience pays
off.
The long-term view in Japan is also supported by managers who
expect to spend their entire career with a single firm.

Because of

this, the goal of those at the managerial level is not to dazzle share
holders with short-term profits, but to ensure the stable long-term
growth of the company.Upon assessing the situation in Japan, one
American executive observed, " I have seen the will to spend capital
without worrying about short-term p r o f i t s . T h e opposite is true in
the United States as executives scramble to pacify stockholders with
large dividends and to ensure that their individual bonuses are of a
sizeable amount.
As the dividends and bonuses are large, so are the problems which
attend the short-term American view.
appropriate example.

High turnover rates are an

In manufacturing and clerical occupations, com

panies have an annual turnover rate of f i f t y percent and as high as
ninety percent in some years; at the executive levels, turnover rates
of twenty-five percent are not unknown.Not surprisingly, many
American employees manifest the same short-term view toward their jobs
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that their employers hold toward the operation of the firm, as the
above figures show.

A view to the long-run can be cost-effective for

the American manager, but for this to occur there must be a change in
corporate philosophy, both on paper and in practice.
In discussing corporate philosophy, a researcher of Japanese busi
ness points out that
. . . the company consists of a set of managers who see
clearly that their capacity to achieve close cooperation
depends in part on their agreeing on a central set of objec
tives and ways of doing business. These agreements comprise
their philosophy of the business, a broad statement that
contemplates the proper relationship of the business to i t s
employees, i t s owners, i t s customers, and the
public-at-large.^^
This philosophy should incorporate a l l relevant business factors, and
be an aid in guiding the firm in the long-run.

"The basic mechanism of

control in a Japanese company i s embodied in a philosophy of management
which describes the objectives and procedures that guide it."50

The

development of a philosophy i s the necessary i n i t i a l step in adapting
the organization towards a long-term outlook because of the element of
control which can be built into the day-to-day functioning of the
organization.

The philosophy facilitates the everyday operation as i t

"provides both control over the way people respond to problems and
coordination between them".51
The coordination is necessary since the Japanese are culturally
averse to face-to-face confrontation.

I t is natural that they rely on

their corporate philosophies for an element of control.

The specific

philosophy is communicated to both management and labor because
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. . . i f everyone understands what the organization i s
trying to do and what i t s values are for how to do things,
then every employee who truly understands the philosophy can
figure out what his or her course of action should be in an
ambiguous situation. No directives or explicit control
system are needed because the controls are internalized.52
American firms can successfully implement a change in their philo
sophies, but upper-level management must support the change for success
to occur.
By adapting to a long-term view, cooperation is fostered both
internally and externally for the organization.

The corporate organi

zation realizes that i t must function proactively within i t s environ
ment.

In order to do this the organization must reconcile itself with

a l l operating forces, from labor unions to governmental agencies.

The

necessity for this to occur within American business is supported by an
analysis of the relations among labor, management and government.

The

present relations are not effective in adapting to the current business
environment.

A great deal of adversarial relations are built into the

American corporate way of thinking, manifesting i t s e l f in both legisla
tion and grievance procedures.

This counter-productive relationship i s

based on a philosophy of contest for splitting the pie between workers
and

owners.

53

Unfortunately, the philosophy of each sector is based on

an individualistic short-term view, in other words, "What can I get for
myself, now!"
The arguments against developing a long-term philosophy are weak
when compared to the long-term success of many Japanese firms.
example aptly proves this to be so.

One

The Amdahl Corporation, a United

17

States computer manufacturer, experienced outstanding growth between
1975 and 1978 as revenues soared from ninety-two million dollars to
three hundred million dollars.54

As i t s sale of computers soared so

did i t s demand for semiconductor chips.

In 1976 another United States

firm. Advanced Memory Systems (AMS) was a supplier for Amdahl.

Through

innovation, Amdahl required a new custom-designed chip and tried to
convince AMS that they would quickly recoup the cost of retooling for
production.

AMS chose instead to get out of the business.

Speaking in

1978, Gerre White, the chairman of Amdahl, assessed the situation by
saying, " I f they (AMS) had stayed with us, our purchases from them
would have been equal to their entire sales at the time they l e f t .
they couldn't wait."55

But

The new supplier which enjoyed the surge in

Amdahl's business was a Japanese firm willing to make a long-term
r\mmi

W i i l l l l I U l l l dI u •

As an American firm commits itself to a long-term philosophy,
practical methods must be implemented for managers and workers, alike,
to change their outlook to the long-term also.

The traditional

American manager is constantly concerned with climbing the corporate
ladder as quickly as possible, looking for his individual rewards.
Upper management continues to encourage this self-centered train of
thought as the novice manager i s evaluated and rewarded upon completion
of an assignment.

This process of rapid evaluation and promotion can

sometimes create a hysterical attitude among managers who feel that
three years without a promotion means they have failed.56

jhe after

math of this whole process i f that people learn to operate without
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depending on or consulting with others, since their career orientation
i s toward the advancement of the self.
To alter this self-centered outlook toward one's career, American
managers need to analyze the benefits of job rotation.

Since Japanese

managers have passed through many of the same functions over the years,
they can refer to a large array of common experiences.

This com

monality provides them with a shorthand form of communication,57 in
that they f u l l y understand the circumstances and problems facing each
department they have worked in.

Because of this knowledge, a sense of

comraderie i s enhanced as wll work toward the good of the firm.

Herein

lies the essence of the second lesson for the American manager; i f the
goals of the firm are to be optimally achieved, then the needs of the
employee must be met f i r s t .

This can be realized i f there is a cor

porate environment which promotes increased partnership for all indi
viduals involved.

Chapter 3
INCREASED PARTNERSHIP
The Japanese are concerned with the employee and the pro
duct- Americans just care about the product. The Japanese
appear very much to want the employee to be comfortable. I
never got the impression that the higher-up Japanese mana
gers don't have time to talk. They usually seem concerned
whereas the American bosses convey a "you have to work,
that's all there is to i t " attitude.
American managers need to change their subservient attitudes
toward their workers and promote an increased partnership between
management and labor.

The personal and job-related needs of a l l the

employees must be f u l f i l l e d as much as possible.

In this way, the

goals of the firm may be met in a cost-effective manner.

The a t t r i 

butes and behavior of individuals must be properly evaluated to utilize
labor resourcefully.

"Concern for the whole employee, not for just his

performance, i s a characteristic of the Japanese company.

This concern

i s essential to attaining high productivity and standards."^9
Japanese managers regard i t as an integral part of their mana
gerial tasks to invest energy and care into the process of accom
modating subordinates' feelings.

This is not to say that certain

American managers are any less s k i l l f u l in these areas than their
Japanese counterparts.

But in acquiring and applying such communi

cation skills and personal attitudes, American managers seem to have
to "swim upstream," culturally.^®

" I f we look at the United States,

there i s a very strong tendency among industrial engineers, economists,
management and government officials to underestimate the potential of
19
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harnessing worker cooperation to raise productivity and to improve
quali ty.
I t w i l l be no easy task for the American manager to adapt, but the
Japanese approach is much more realistic and pragmatic.

Ironically,

within American organizations the characteristics of clarity, certainty
and perfection are highly valued, while the nature of human rela
tionships involve ambiguity, uncertainty and imperfection.

How one

honors, balances and integrates the needs of both is the real challenge
of effective management.
The work group is one technique of Japanese managerial style which
f u l f i l l s specific needs of workers.

A sense of belonging and par

ticipation in the decision-making process results from group effort and
participation.

An indication of the high level of the will to work

among Japanese factory workers is the small group activities such as
quality control circles and zero defect movements which have been
widely introduced, inspired by the series of reforms carried out by
Sony i n t h e e a r l y 1 9 6 0 ' s f o r t h e p u r p o s e o f human

r e c o v e r y . 6 3

Many

analysts would agree that the American business sector is in a prime
position for human recovery.
In Japan no one individual carries responsibility for a particular
turf.

Rather, a group or team of employees assumes joint respon-

c i b i l i t y for a set of t a s k s . I n the same light, the American manager
must also attempt to share responsibility for the functioning of a
department with those around him.

This is a philosophical change which

21

must come about to achieve the aforementioned goals of partnership.

An

American executive on tour i n Japan was to comment,
"Nearly every time I heard an employee of Intel or one of
the other companies refer to the firm, i t was as 'we.'"
This sense of belonging is indeed real by financial
standards as Intel employees have invested $60 million
of their own money into the company through a special stock
purchase plan.^^
Americans strive on individualism whereas working in groups has
been alleged to come naturally to the Japanese as their culture sup
ports the group concept.

Working in groups may not be any more natural

for them than i t is for Americans.

The Japanese, however, have been

willing to give much more effort to developing and maintaining group
f u n c t i o n s . W o r k i n g in groups i s not necessarily i n contrast to
America's love of individualism.

Philosophically, "two versions of

individualism exist—one which focuses on selfishness and takes advan
tage of the group, and one which focuses on self-actualization in the
interest of maximizing for both the individual and the group, the
talents latent in the

m e m b e r s .

l a t t e r style can be implanted in

American organizations, with the support of management.
the irony of the group process.

Herein lies

In order for a firm to adapt to a

"bottom-up" philosophy, i t must be implemented "top-down."
One of the greatest fears that U.S. managers have of groups is
that responsibility and accountability will become diffused.

These

managers feel the need to be able to identify individually who is
accountable for what, even when the realities of a task may make shared
responsibility more appropriate.68

The group needs to be held equally
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accountable for the actions of each member.
become more dependent on one another.

Thereby, the members

The American manager must

realize that this dependency does not weaken the group's drive to excel
and to achieve.

On the contrary, i t seems to feed the group's ambi

tion, as proven in many Japanese work

groups.

^9

When implementing work groups, the American executive is certain
to appoint a leaderj, which is seen as a prestigious position, but this
perception can be detrimental to the functioning of the group process;
members strive for leadership, foregoing their common goal of cohesion.
"The Japanese are indifferent to who will be the leader in the group.
A leader i s not a dictator; he is a member of the group and is only
temporarily responsible for the actions of the group—maintaining har
mony i s the most important task of the leader."^0

He does not

selfishly strive to advance his own career, but functions in a selfactualizing manner to help bring the group as a whole to fruition.
Again, attitudes nurtured by the underlying fundamental philosophy play
a crucial role in improving the quality of work l i f e .
Japan places people f i r s t in i t s priority s y s t e m , a philosophy
which is highly contrasted in American management as the traditional
"bottom-line" dictates the outcome of the decision-making process.
This people-first attitude has proven beneficial in developing a cohe
sive work force.

While Western laborers are said to be attached to

their profession, to an individual job, their Japanese counterparts are
said to be attached to their companies.

The Japanese work ethic, which

i s defined as maintenance of a sense of purpose, derives form company
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loyalty.

Such allegiance is not ethnically Japanese corporate

management.72
The overriding principle that comes through to us from the
Japanese principles of management i s : they treat employees
as human beings. Each employee i s part of the "family."
Each employee gets a chance to participate in company decision
making, through quality circles, i f not otherwise. This
apparently has built a great sense of company loyalty in
the employees.
The simplicity of these facts i s supportive evidence that much the same
can be achieved within American firms.
There are several other factors which also foster company loyalty
among Japanese workers.

The Japanese managers in the past f e l t that i f

workers were dismissed during slow periods, i t might not be possible to
recruit enough people when the next upturn began.

Training costs were

thus saved and the system of lifetime employment became entrenched
within the Japanese corporate structure.^4

in present-day form this

system i s widely misconstrued as only thirty percent 75 of the Japanese
labor force is working under this system.

S t i l l these workers are more

loyal to their companies because of life-time employment and the
seniority-based wage system.76
Japanese labor unions are also a key factor as to why the Japanese
workers develop such fierce company loyalty.

The system is in direct

contrast to the American labor union system.

"Japanese labor unions

are organized on a company-by-company basis encouraging a strong sense
of sharing the fate of their company.

This sense is reinforced by the

fierce competition among industries for a bigger market

share.

"77

American union system is so entrenched that i t is highly unlikely that
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i t will change, but this should not be used as an obstacle to
increasing worker loyalty to the firm.
American managers need to revamp their reward system for workers.
Instead of rewarding individual performance in production a worker
should be rewarded for his ability to develop the people with whom he
works, to quietly foster results that benefit the company as a whole.
This revamped reward system will provide the necessary cohesion among
workers instead of reinforcing the Americanized competition.
I f a partnership i s to be formed within the American firm the next
lesson for the American manager is self-evident; an increased openness
in organizational structure and interactive communication must take
place.

As one can see, this and the preceding lessons are a l l finely

interwoven, supportive of one another, forming a complete perspective.
The same should be true of the components of the American workplace.

Chapter 4
INCREASED OPENNESS
Private offices are a status symbol in the United States.
I worry about those walls. Americans spend a lot of time
in their offices and call people in. But there i s a
possible problem—it creates distance between managers
and their subordinates and col leagues.
In order to eliminate communication barriers, and to nurture the
sense of partnership, both the physical and attitudinal structure of
the traditional American firm must be altered.

The American manager

must facilitate communication at a l l levels and involve necessary indi
viduals in the decision-making process.

The Japanese appear to have

employed techniques which have proven very succesful in fostering and
enhancing communication.
As a rule, the physical structure of major Japanese offices i s a
large open space.

An entire group of white collar workers, belonging

to one business division, work at desks with no partitions.

This

environment encourages constant human contact and intimacy between
superiors and subordinates, and among subordinates themselves.^0
Interpersonal skills are nurtured by the physical setting.

The same i s

not true for the traditional American offices which neatly partition
individuals behind four walls.

Implicit communication is a feature of

Japanese human relations cultivated within an intimate group environment.
This arrangement offers several benefits other than strictly moti
vation and communication.
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1.

I t fosters a consistency in behavior.
The middle manager would find i t
d i f f i c u l t to treat subordinates
differently from superiors.

2.

I t puts a premium on performance, since
everyone i s witness to everyone else.

3.

I t greatly assists evaluation of
performance at a l l levels.

This physical office design i s also supported by constructive
channels of communication.
door policy.

Many of the Japanese companies have an open

Each employee has access to each manager regardless of

the chain of command.

Higher managers are rarely i n their offices, as

they spend much of their time in the large open work areas, which
facilitates direct

contact.

j h e opposite is true in America where

many managers appear to be closeted away in their prized cells.
Because of the large amount of exposure to managers by the
Japanese workers, the Japanese boss i s more of a mentor.

He teaches

through subtle cues rather than blunt feedback, exercising great
patience while the subordinate learns how to interpret cues and to
develop his or her own skills.

At the same time, this manager is rein

forcing the basic company philosophy as a conceptual source that helps
subordinates to decide what to do in a given s i t u a t i o n . T h i s inbred
implicit communication aids in the smooth functioning of day-to-day
operations.
American managers f a i l to realize the importance of facilitating
communication.

In the Japanese firm, interdepartmental consultation

and negotiation is understood to be everyone's concern, whereas
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American managers rarely coordinate communication well.

"They lack

human skills and seem much less familiar with other parts of the organ
ization.

A good Japanese-style middle manager knows everybody so he

can get good information."84

American executives are quoted by

Japanese managers as saying, "I've spent the whole damn day on the
telephone and I didn't get anything done because people kept
interrupting me."^^

What Americans view as petty distraction from

their jobs, the Japanese view as central to theirs.
Once the American manager realizes the importance of establishing
an open communicative rapport with his firm, the garnered information
must be properly utilized, especially within the decision-making pro
cess.

Japanese managers demand far more responsible participation of

a l l workers than American managers do.

The Japanese believe that a l l

employees are capable of thinking a problem
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surprising to American businessmen as they see the Japanese listening
to and adopting the suggestions made by their employees.

When an

important decision needs to be made in a Japanese organization,
" . . . everyone who w i l l feel i t s impact i s involved i n making i t .
What i s important i s not the decision i t s e l f , but rather how committed
and informed people are.

The 'best' decision can be bungled, just as

the 'worst' decision can work just fine."^^
The Japanese process is focused on understanding the problem.

In

gathering pertinent information, the process i s geared to discovering
what the decision should be.

I t s result is a meeting of the minds that

there i s , or is not, a need for a change in behavior.^^

By
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understanding an issue, the participants are better able to commit them
selves to the formation of a decision.

"The findings of behavioral

science suggest that often the quality of commitment to a decision
rather than the quality of some dimension of the decision itself i s
the most critical factor in the fate of a project."89
In brief, the purpose of participatory management is to reach a
consensus based on close coordination of the activities of each func
tional area affected by the issue.

For the Westerner,

. . . a decision process based on consensus conveys a host
of horrors—interminable meetings, endless squabbling
and ultimate indecision. The Japanese system does not
demand that a l l participants "sign o f f . " Those that
affix their seals are giving their consent, not necessarily
their approval. He has been heard, will go along with i t
and support i t , though he may s t i l l disagree.
This seemingly cumbersome decision process takes place within the
framework of an underlying agreement on philosophy, values and beliefs.
Again, this is pointing to the importance of f i r s t developing an actual
working philosophy under which the firm may function.
American managers have been bred to be dependent on their leader.
Many Japanese chief executives of American subsidiaries equate consen
sus with abrogation of their personal responsibi1ty for the firm's per
formance, and thus both parties are bewildered.

The leadership

practice is expected and supported by American subordinates, and this is
particularly strong in small to medium-sized firms.

Japanese managers

merely listen to both sides of an argument and typically conclude in
silence.

The Japanese do not understand why the Americans do not just

go ahead and resolve the known problems

themselves.The

Japanese
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are willing to share organizational authority, and often times the
American manager i s not prepared to grasp i t .
American manager now appears apropos:
authori ty.

The next lesson for the

The sharing of organizational

Chapter 5
SHARING ORGANIZATIONAL AUTHORITY
All the Japanese here (U.S.A.) have had problems managing
the
Americans. The Japanese expect the subordinates to
think, but the American attitude i s , "You t e l l me what to do
and I ' l l do i t - - but i t ' s your r e s p o n s i b i 1 i t y . " 9 2
The problems with this "American" attitude is that American
workers do not wish to assume authority with i t s contingent respon
sibilities.

Herein lies a challenge for American management.

In

meeting this challenge people must be considered an energy source, and
the goal of management is not to control but to release the energy in
people.

This is done by the Japanese manager's insistence that his

people think and participate responsibly in business affairs.

The p r i 

mary role of management is not in giving orders, but in facilitating
action, bringing about the cooperation and consensus among dissident
viewpoints.

There is no limit to what American industry could

accomplish i f the creative thinking people demonstrate in every other
area of their lives could be given f u l l expression in their jobs.^^
Possibly indicating a trend, American chief executive officers
show that the keynote of management style today is shared authority at
the top.

This is in contrast to the highly autocratic, one-man rule of

the past.

Most chief executives are progressively distributing much of

their responsibility to others in the company.Though i t is
encouraging to see this sharing of authority at managerial levels, i t
30
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must trickle down to labor as well, in order for an organization to
truly reap the benefits of this type of decentralized management.
In Japan a group of touring American businesmen found the workers
"incredibly well-educated, using analytical tools used only by pro
fessionals in the United States.

American top management tends to rely

on high-level engineers to design parts and machinery that defy human
error because the workers are viewed as

idiots.

"95

j\ resource within

American firms i s being l e f t untapped.

To counter this in their firms,

Japanese managers are encouraging workers to approach their jobs with
ingenuity and commitment, and are getting excellent results.

The

employees of Toyota Motors in Japan are a good example.
Every year Toyota Motors is getting about nine suggestions
for improvements per employee and i s adopting more than
eighty percent of them. By contrast. General Motors gets
less than one suggestion per employee per year and adopts
less than a fourth of those received. Not only are Japanese
companies getting more suggestions, but they are getting
better ones.^^
The Japanese managers consider workers to be not tools, but individuals
with great potential for creative input.
In order for American managers to facilitate action in lieu of
giving orders, barriers which exist between management and labor must
be eliminated.

"The most productive American auto plants are those

that have paid the most attention to fuzzing the class lines between
management and l a b o r . T h e YKK (USA) plant, a Japanese subsidiary,
in Macon, Georgia has done just that.

This zipper manufacturer, with

thirty percent of the world market, motivates i t s employees in conven
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tional ways, but the key to success in terms of quality and produc
t i v i t y i s management and labor working together as peers.

One YKK

manager states, "First, you as a manager clean the floor yourself, then
the employees will do i t .

In order for management to teach employees

they must have done the jobs first."98

Unless both management and

labor change their old ways, the United States will continue to t r a i l
Japan.
American workers need to have their energies channeled toward the
delineated corporate goals.

American executives, trained to prepare

detailed operational procedures for the rank and f i l e employees to per
form their outlined tasks, s t i f l e creativity and individual motivation
with this procedure.

Worker frustration results in actions to decrease

quality and productivity.

One perplexed worker remarks, "We know this

work better than any other person.

We in the line consult with each

other on how to improve our own work, and are happy to see our own work
improved.

What is wrong with that?"99

In the above situation, manage

ment did not want the workers making mechanical adjustments for they
were infringing on the technician's territory; low quality products
were to be overlooked!
The practical implementation of the sharing of authority can be
manifested in a variety of ways.

Formally, a system of "presentation

meetings" can help to stimulate workers.
A line worker, for instance, will present the results of a
study made by his team and propose concrete suggestions for
improvement before an audience which includes his supervisors
and management personnel. This helps heighten the sense of
participation, instead of alienation in the workplace.
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Informally, the Japanese have been able to mesh their employees by
requiring all workers, at a l l levels, to wear the same work clothes,
eat in the same cafeteria, and use the same restrooms.
done in some Japanese subsidiaries in the United States.

This has been
Some of the

American workers feel uncomfortable with the conformity, but Japanese
executives are respected f o r sharing the same work c o n d i t i o n s . T h i s
earned respect has fostered a more dedicated work force, thereby
increasing productivity.

Improved productivity is in fact at the heart

of the following lesson:

American managers must acknowledge the need

for ongoing research for improved productivity i f they are to compete in
the global marketplace.

Chapter 6
IMPROVING PRODUCTIVITY
After a Japanese firm took over an American Motorola color
TV plant the rate of defects dropped from 150-180 errors
per 100 sets to 3-4 errors per 100 sets.^^2
The guiding ethos of Japanese industry is the ongoing search for
quality and productivity improvements.

When an idea i s implemented

that results in better productivity or product quality, the search
begins anew for a successor idea.

This process never ends.^®^

The

shared responsibility between managers and workers, along with con
sultative decision-making, help to support this constant re-examination
of the production process.

Various examples of the Japanese revital

izing a faltering American plant are concrete testimony that the Japan
ese management practices can be successful when transplanted to a
United States manufacturing environment.
The real success of the Japanese is not founded on some magical
formula, but rather on a methodical pursuit of improving productivity
in manufacturing practices.

Says Masao Kanamori, president of

Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, "The existence of our company would be
impossible i f we failed to reassess our performance in quality, produc
tion and cost."^0^

Japanese realize that they must constantly re

assess their goals i f they are to compete in the long-run.
This same long-term commitment is absent in American business.
Even American executives are cognizant of this fact.

David Entreken,

president of Desco, Inc., in California, is quoted as saying,
34
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"No significant sector of U.S. industry has a five-year plan
for automating factories, or even a ten-year plan. In
Japan, one company had a plan for a plant in 1966 that was
to be remodernized five years later. I t was remodernized in
1971 and again in 1976. In 1981, the plant was scheduled to
be remodernized again, and in future years.
The Japanese are more practical than the Americans in realizing that
technology i s in a constant state of upheaval, and to compete e f f i 
ciently one must constantly be operating in a state-of-the-art environ
ment.

For i f he does not, his competition w i l l .
Several examples of the lack of re-investing capital to improve

productivity can be found in American industries.

The United States

auto industry emphasized marketing in i t s strategy much more than they
emphasized technology.

The steel industry also lost i t s technological

leadership to Japan over thirty years ago.^®^

A commitment to tech

nology should supersede, in some ways, a commitment to improving rela
tions with employees.

"When i t comes to making steel, a good attitude

i s not as important as a basic-oxygen furnace.

On the auto-assembly

line, no amount of team spirit will make a door f i t more closely than
i t s designed t o l e r a n c e . T h e combination of state-of-the-art tech
nology and a dynamic work force within a manufacturing environment
deliver dramatic results in both quality and production, as shown in Japan.
The participation of employees in utilizing current technology i s
just as important as in the decision-making process, thus the input of
quality control circles must be considered.
in improving quality and productivity.

Up-to-date technology aids

In repetitive manufacturing

quality improvements reduce waste and rework, and smooth the output
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rate, thereby improving productivity.
and productivity blurs.

The distinction between quality

Japanese quality circles are oriented toward

both quality and productivity improvements, whereas in the United
States quality circles are usually concerned exclusively with quality
m a t t e r s . T h e connection to productivity i s overlooked.

The

Japanese manager perceives increased productivity to be a by-product of
management policies; i t i s not a main goal of the companies.

Quality

i s a main goal; learning curve improvements are a main goal.

Out of

these come productivity increases.

The Japanese view the problem on a

conceptual basis, while the Americans utilize an analytical
approach.
Having given ample attention to quality control, Japanese managers
are now confronted with the new task of encouraging individual workers
to be creative and original.

These qualities go much better with

American individualism and personal freedom than with the groupism
built on the principles of self-denial and hierarchical loyalty.
The answer may be continuous training, whereby every employee par
ticipates in formal training as a regular part of his job until he
retires.

In the United States training is promotion-focused, while the

Japanese training is performance-focused.m

The Japanese feel that

the continual training will foster creativity within the highly tech
nological industries.

American managers have the same problem, only in

reverse — American workers are independently creative, but need to
improve their collective work quality.
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When speaking of quality and production the most powerful example
for American management i s Japan's reliance on "do i t yourself."
Japanese firms train their own workers, build their own production
equipment, and then make their own improvements.

Engineers are closely

involved with ongoing problems; their offices are usually adjacent to
the factory floor.

Workers even help design machines and describe pro

ducts during sales calls.

In contrast, American industry has isolated

engineers in separate buildings.

U.S. firms are almost wholly depen

dent on equipment suppliers because they cannot build or even modify
their

equipment.

g y bringing together the engineer's expertise and

the worker's experience, a more dynamic resource is created to improve
quality and productivity.
Concerning technological innovations, the Japanese pattern has
been to import technology, improve upon i t , then replace i t with native
machinery and product design.

The Japanese are obtaining productive

results, as the following examples show.

Between 1964 and 1975 the

Japanese dramatically increased the productivity of their steel
industry, reducing the man hours required to produce a ton of steel
from 25.2 to 9.2.1^3

During the same years American productivity

improved only slightly, from 13.1 to 10.9.^1'^

In the auto industry,

thirty-five workers aided by industrial robots produce three hundred
f i f t y Datsun car bodies every eight hours, seven times the productivity
rate of competing American

automakers.

US

The failure to develop long-term strategies has led many other
United States industries to lose the technological leadership they
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maintained fifteen to twenty years ago.

Michelin of France provides a

concise example of the American manager's reluctance to adapt to tech
nological advancements.
Michelin of France led the way in radial tires even
though i t was obvious to most American tire-industry execu
tives that the radial t i r e was a superior product. But i f
they went into i t , they would make a l l the existing invest
ment in the standard bias-belted tires obsolete. So they
delayed and delayed.
In the short-run they increased their profits, but in
the long-run they induced Michelin to enter the U.S. and
build plants here. The Japanese are here, too. So American
t i r e companies are frantically trying to do under duress
what they should have been doing more leisurely and care
f u l l y ten to fifteen years ago.^^®
The computer, semiconductor and aircraft industries have main
tained technological leadership in the United States, but even they are
under pressure.

The Japanese are making a determined attack on the

computer industry and the success of the European-made Airbus is stimu
lating American aircraft firms to increase technological
development.American managers need the competition to force them,
in many cases, to keep an eye to the future.
The Japanese prove that to be adaptable to innovative technology
there must be a capital commitment on the part of management.
"Japanese business leaders believe in making investments that may seem
risky in the short-run, as long as they look profitable in the
l o n g - r u n . I n terms of research and development, the Japanese are
spending much more than their United States counterparts.

American

corporations spend "an average of about one percent of total sales
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on research and development.

In Japan the figure i s closer to six

p e r c e n t . T h e Japanese are investing as much money, in absolute
terms, as the United States businessmen are - - or about twice the rate
per capita.120

The facts and figures may seem dismal to the American manager but
there are definite signs of hope.

The deep-rooted problems afflicting

American business are not insurmountable, and there are varied examples
of recovery within firms and industries which support that fact.

After

World War I I Japan was an eager student of the United States, as the
island nation reconstructed i t s society amidst devastation.

The time

has now come for American businessmen to let Japan f u l f i l l the role of
the teacher, and let themselves be the student.

Actually, this is

already occurring to some degree, as the following chapter shows that
Japanese managerial principles and techniques are alive and well in the
United States.

Chapter 7

JAPANESE MANAGEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
The Japanese raise quizzical eyebrows at U.S. management
experts who have been descending on Japan in droves to learn
of the secrets of their amicable employee relations, high
productivity and company loyalty. The Japanese freely admit
they learned about quality circles, operations management,
and other techniques from the United S t a t e s . ^ 2 1
Examples of the successful implementation of Japanese managerial
style within the United States are numerous.

They speak for them

selves, and are testament to the fact that the i l l s that plague
American business are curable.

Japanese subsidiaries in the United

States and American firms adapting the Japanese style have shown that
the American workers are highly productive under the correct supportive
circumstances.

A long-term view, partnership, communication, shared

power, and research and development commitments are all evidenced in
the following examples.

First, a look at Japanese subsidiaries in the

United States.
Sanyo Electric, Inc., of Los Angeles i n s t i l l s company loyalty in
American workers with extensive benefits.

Yoshimi Takemoto, president

of the electronics firm, said, "We try to get inside the heart and make
them realize they are not just part of a machine.
all

equally.

We try to treat them

B y instilling pride in the workers, productivity and

quality have risen.

In Forest City, Arkansas, the Warwick Electronics

plant, a subsidiary of the Whirlpool Corporation, was taken over by
Sanyo Electric.

Mr. Takemoto initiated a clean-up program shortly
40
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thereafter.

The plant had been operating with a deficit.

The improved

housekeeping gave the workers a sense of pride, resulting in a better
product.

An employee confidence program was also instituted.

Production rose "from four hundred twenty-five TV sets per day to two
thousand eight hundred sets per day, and roughly one thousand laid-off
employees have returned to

work.

"123

American workers have indeed responded to the Japanese managerial
philosophy.

In the farm belt of Wisconsin, where a Japanese food com

pany established a plant, a technician said:
" I like my job. I t is interesting and gives me a chance to
advance. I take satisfaction in contributing to a good prod
uct. The Japanese are patient decision makers. They
listen to many opinions before making up their minds. When
a decision is made, you know that i t has been well thought
out."124
Testimonials such as this are heard in various locations in the United
States.

Problems with communication and cultural misunderstanding do

occur, but when the Japanese managers resolve the issues the firm
actively prospers.
Perhaps the following passage best describes the atmosphere and
success of a U.S. Japanese subsidiary.
Time clocks are banned from the premises. Managers and
workers converse on a first-name basis and eat lunch
together in the company cafeteria. Employees are briefed
once a month by a top executive on sales and production
goals and are encouraged to air their complaints. Four
times a year, workers attend company-paid parties. Says
Betty Price, an assembly line person, "Working for Sony i s
like working for your family." This year the San Diego
plant will turn out 700,000 color television sets, one third
of Sony's total world production. More significantly, com
pany officials now proudly say that the plant's produc
t i v i t y approaches that of i t s Japanese facilities. Plant
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manager Shiro Yamada insists that there are a few differ
ences between workers in the U.S. and Japan. Says he:
"Americans are as quality conscious as the Japanese. But
the question has been how to motivate them.''^^^
From that last statement by Mr. Yamada there i s evidence that many
problems in United States industry do stem from management, not from
the workers.

This i s supported by the experience of the Volkswagens

of America plant in Pennsylvania.

Executives at Volkswagens found

"that Rabbits made in America were just as good as the German ones.
Was this work force different from those who turn out low quality
Pintos and Aspens?

No — the workers are a l l U.A.W. members.

ference i s design, management and newer

equipment.

The d i f 

"^^6

Ironically, there are many firms in the United States that have
been using the techniques found in Japanese management, long before the
Japanese came upon these techniques.

In research performed with

American managers from several industries, each manager was asked to
name any American companies that had characteristies thought to be
peculiar to Japanese firms.

Managers named the same organizations

repeatedly; I.B.M., Proctor and Gamble, Hewlett-Packard and Eastman
Kodak.

^27

/\n I.B.M . vice president was quoted as saying, "Do you

realize that this form that you have been describing as Japanese is
exactly what I.B.M. is?

Let me point out that I.B.M. has developed to

this form in i t s own way - - we have not copied the

Japanese.

"^28

jhe

main reason for pointing out the success of these techniques in
American firms is to dispel arguments of the American cultural barriers
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thought to prohibit implementation of these techniques considered by
many to be uniquely Japanese.
University professors of business administration cite American
firms, such as Delta Air Lines, which also have some of the Japanese
characteristics.

Delta, an airline industry leader, i s admired for i t s

management style.

Employees at Delta do not just join a company, they

join an objective in partnership with management and labor.
The Delta family feeling has made i t hard for unions to gain
a foothold. When the airlines suffered from the 1973 o i l
price hikes. Delta did not lay off some employees as did
other airlines. "Now the time has come for the stockholders
to pay a l i t t l e penalty for keeping the team together," said
the company chiarman.^^^
Delta's "family feeling" was present in December of 1982 when grate
ful employees purchased, through payroll deductions, a thirty million
dollar Boeing jetliner in appreciation to the company.

Says William

Batten, chairman and chief executive officer for the New York Stock
Exchange:
spirit.

"The g i f t i s a dramatic, visible expression of an invisible
I t shows that "Delta's employees identify their personal well-

being with the company well-being.
us together.

I t is not a we-they attitude, but

What a symbol this is to American business.

A classic case of improved productivity within an American firm i s
the General Motors plant in Tarrytown, New York.

The company began a

quality of work l i f e program amidst major labor conflicts and quality
deficiencies.

As union members were invited to provide more than brute

labor, their innovations improved the quality of the product and their
commitment transformed the atmosphere of the plant.

Grievances against
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management fell from two thousand to thirty, and absenteeism decreased
from seven percent to two and one-half percent.131

jhis plant is now

one of General Motors success stories.
The high tech industry is often cited as one that is well managed.
A brief history of one firm does explain why.

The success of the mana

gerial style described throughout this paper is apparent.
Intel, an American firm, was founded in 1968. Since that
time, i t s sales have increased by an average of thirty per
cent each year. I t puts more than ten percent of i t s income
into research and development, a higher rate than any of i t s
competitors. I t also brings in more than twice as much
revenue per employee as the industry norm. Intel's story is
an advertisement for the classic ingredients in American
business success: venture capital, initial risks, technical
pioneering, and plowing the profits back into the firm.
There is no suite of offices at Intel, managers share a com
mon s p a c e . 132
A long-term view, partnership, communication, shared authority and a
research and development commitment are all Intel,

CONCLUSION
In many ways, the lessons from the East help us to return to some
old American values.

Teamwork has been a part of the American ideal

for a long time, but at least in our business affairs, we have placed
i t second to self and individualism.

. . .The Japanese experience

gives us firm evidence that teamwork and group effectiveness have pro
ductive

values.
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American researchers have delineated the characteristics and tech
niques of Japanese management in several ways.

Ouchi cites seven

characteristics which describe the Japanese style:
1.

Lifetime Employment

2.

Slow Evaluation and Promotion

3.

Nonspecialized Career Paths

4.

Implicit Control Mechanisms

5.

Collective Decision Making

6.

Collective Responsibility

7.

Wholistic Concernl34

Pucik and Hatvany have developed a three-tier model of Japanese manage
ment concentrating on human resource management, rearranging several of
Ouchi's characteristies.
1.

Focus:

Emphasize human resource management.

2.

General Strategies:

Develop an internal labor market, articu

late a unique company philosophy, and engage in intensive
socialization.
45
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3.

Specific Techniques:

Job rotation and slow promotion, evalu

ation of employee attributes and behavior, emphasis on work
groups, open communication, consultative decision making, and
concern for the employee.
The five principles cited in this paper as "lessons" for the
American manager incorporate the spirit of the techniques of both of
the aforementioned models.
1.

Developing a long-term view towards business practices stems
from the spirit of re-investing for the future, life-time
employment, slow evaluation and promotion, and is stated in a
unique company philosophy as all five points may be.

2.

Promoting increased partnership to f u l f i l l the needs of the
firm and employee highlights implicit control
mechanisms, wholistic concern for the employee, and an empha
sis on work groups.

3.

Increasing openness in organizational structure and com
munication stresses collective or consultative decision making
and open communication.

4.

Sharing organizational authority is synonymous with collective
responsibility while evaluating employee attributes and beha
vior, to utilize employee talents.

5.

Realizing the need for ongoing research for improved produc
t i v i t y is a crucial aspect of a long-term company philosophy
found in many Japanese firms.

47

These five principles, compared above, need to be the cornerstone of
American managerial techniques for American industry to remain vital.
Many aspects of traditional American management are simply no
longer accepted in other societies.

Theories and techniques which were

successful during the expanding 1950's and 1960's are no longer appli
cable.

This is proven by Japanese productivity growth which is not

languishing to the extent of American

productivity,

^ 3 6 even though the

Japanese economy is subject to dependence on expensive oil imports,
strict government regulations, and demanding labor unions.
In revamping their style, American managers must be selective.
Some Japanese techniques are likely to f a i l in the United States.
American businessmen are certain to be repelled by the notion of l i f e 
time employment.
either.

This specific technique is not necessarily desired,

What is important is that the American managers develop a

long-term view towards business practices, as has been put forth in
this paper.

By increasing the bonds between the employer and employee,

the employee will remain with a firm longer, i f his needs are met.
In contrast to Japanese executives, American managers have a
short-term view.

American performance evaluations are based on short-

range financial measures.

This pressure on short-term results is a

major factor in thwarting the impetus of industrial technological
leadership which the United States enjoyed in the past.^37

with

foreign competition advancing, American managers have been thrust
towards introspection to ameliorate the problems affecting their
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industries.

Developing a long-term view toward business practices is a

definite beginning.
Slow evaluation and promotion also have their shortcomings.

An

employee needs the feedback of evaluation to re-assess his skills, and
he should be rewarded for his accomplishments, both as an individual
and as a member of his department.

There is a balance which must be

maintained between the group-oriented philosophy and individualism.
Both can co-exist within the same organization and should be
recogni zed.
Non-specialized career paths are not generally found in American
management, and again may not be desirable, though the advantages of
job rotation must not be overlooked.

Within many Japanese companies i t

is customary to move employees from one department to another every two
or three years.

In the process the employee acquires varied

t r a i n i n g . T h e American employee would be able to satisfy his need
for a new challenge while utilizing his expertise from previous posi
tions.

Japanese managers feel "that this policy gives the employees a

broader view of what the company is trying to do, and helps to build an
emotional attachment to the company.Turnover rates remain lower
and the employee realizes he will benefit in the long-run from being
exposed to various business functions.
Within highly skilled occupations, specialization is necessary,
but once a manager has this technical foundation he should be given the
opportunity to expose himself to the other functional areas of the
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firm.

This will enhance not only his understanding of the organiza

tion's operational procedures, but also his effectiveness as a
decision-making manager.
Because of the ambiguous environment in which the business sector
operates in the long-run, there is a need to foster more of a sense of
partnership among employees.

"Certainly a system that makes people

feel a part of the firm by being partners in the peril and progress of
their company makes more sense than one in which employees receive
salary increases even when their company suffers an earnings
d e c l i n e , w h i c h indeed does occur in many American firms.
Management and labor must share in the fate of the firm; a fate which
is partially determined by the actions of the individuals involved.

As

Mike Markkula, an executive of Apple Computer, states, "If you took all
the people out of the buildings, what you'd have is a bunch of
buildings.

The company i s worth nothing without i t s p e o p l e . H u m a n

beings are a firm's greatest asset, and must be developed accordingly.
Some American managers allege that participatory management will
lead to chaos and confusion within a firm.
true.

This does not have to be

Participatory methods of management can work in the United

States, but they must be based on the premise that teamwork and par
ticipation are better ways to solve problems because knowledge, infor
mation and skills are distributed among a number of

people.

Though

this cooperative attitude is a drastic change from the individualistic
attitude prevalent in American business, the consensus decision-making
process can be successful i f properly understood.
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Richard A. Kraft, Quasar's vice president of engineering, admits
"that the committee approach is bothersome at f i r s t because i t takes
time and appears to delay decisions needlessly.

I have learned,

though, to appreciate the approach because i t results in solutions that
work from the outset rather than ones arrived at through trial and
e r r o r . A l s o , American managers are trying to "sell" their deci
sions.

The Japanese need to spend absolutely no time on "selling" a

decision; everybody has been presold.
By forming an alliance with labor, through partnership and collec
tive decision-making, traditional American managers may feel intimi
dated.

There is no need for American management to feel threatened by

workers in thinking that they will usurp managerial authority.

Line

workers, as previously stated, want to perform their job as efficiently
as possible.

Management must facilitate this to happen by giving

employees the authority to influence the firm in matters which they are
knowledgeable.

Productivity is certain to improve with a conscientious

and responsible work force.
With a commitment to improving quality and productivity, and to
developing a dedicated work force, American firms must operate in a
flexible manner to be able to adapt to necessary new technology.

These

same firms must not only react to new technology, but must also operate
in a proactive manner.

Since World War I I , technological progress in

Japan has depended on the efforts of the private sector.

In the United

States, technological development has been the government's task and
has been concentrated on military and space technology.The United
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States private sector needs to commit more capital to research and
development i f i t is to remain competitive amidst such technological
flux.
Criticism of several of the recommended principles is present and
is recognized.

Recently, an issue of the Niehouse Report criticized

the use of quality circles and other so-called imported management
techniques in the United S t a t e s . r e p o r t stated that cooperative
and participatory management and high productivity are successful in
Japan because of the Japanese culture's group philosophy.

The report

cites that cultural conflicts exist in the United States which may
hinder the use of these techniques in American organizations.
Admittedly, conflicts do exist, but they can be overcome, especially i f
constructive communication channels are correctly implemented within an
organi zati on.
I t is essential to remember that the quality circle philosophy and
techniques are of American origin, fully exploited by the Japanese.
Therefore, the U.S. firms are importing nothing from abroad, but are
being forced to re-examine traditional labor and management philo
sophies in the United States.

The success of the Japanese importation

i

I of American techniques is now the catalyst for this re-examination.
\ Unfortunately, a crisis situation was needed to force American managers
toward introspection.
The report also goes on to say that "group philosophy is stifling;
not strong enough to contain individualities."1^7

jhig criticism is a

valid one as many Japanese workers do feel frustrated and coerced
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because of the rigid group structure of their organizations.

A

stifling group atmosphere is the fault of management, just as a
creative group atmosphere is to management's credit.
fect, and the Japanese do not pretend to be so.
i t y must be interwoven in responsible leadership.

No system is per

An amount of flexibil
American managers

...should exercise leadership that is flexible
enough to effectively reach organizational goals and
respect the individuals who will achieve those
goals. To be effective such leadership must be
flexible enough to support team work, without
getting trapped by the group philosophy approach,
and s t i l l encourage individuality and c r e a t i v i t y .
The firm that develops a credible sense of stability and security
enhances i t s flexibility.

Security and stability will be nurtured by

the firm that:
1.

Develops a long-term view towards business practices.

2.

Promotes increased partnership to f u l f i l l the needs of the firm
and employee.

3.

Increases openness in organizational structure and com
munication,

4.

Shares organizational authority,

5.

Realizes the need for ongoing research for improved
producti vi ty,

Such are the lessons American managers are now being taught by their
Japanese counterparts.
With the onslaught of advanced technology, the growth of the serv
ice sector in American business, and the ever increasing competition
in the international marketplace, American business now finds itself in
a period of transition comparable only to the Industrial Revolution.
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American management must now strengthen i t s industrial organizations to
remain viable competitors.
must not be lost.

The experience of Britain's climacteric

The Japanese have proven to the international com

munity that an economy can rise from devastation to prosperity in a
relatively short time.

In the shadow of such a feat, American managers

should be avid students, now that their own protege, Japan, is sur
passing i t s teacher.
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